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INDORSEMENTS FOR COLLECTION
INDORSEMENTS FOR COLLECTION:--
UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ATHOL LEE TAYLOR t
An indorsement which "constitutes the indorsee the agent of
indorser" is by the Negotiable Instruments Law,' Section 36 (2),
classified as a restrictive indorsement. The prevalent use of this
indorsement by the commercial world has been the source of
much litigation, resulting in a perplexing confusion and con-
flict of decisions. Indeed the Uniform Commercial Code,2 now
in the state of preparation by the American Law Institute and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws,
has eliminated the use of the term "restrictive" entirely. Sec-
tion 3-206 of the Code is intended to eliminate many of the
difficulties which have arisen under the N.I.L. as presently
constituted. These difficulties which the proposed Code seeks to
avoid are occasioned by the application of provisions of the
N.I.L which approach the problem of the collecting agent from
an entirely different point of view and upon an entirely different
basic theory.
The legal effect of such a restrictive indorsement under the
N.I.L. is provided for by two sections, Sections 37 and 47. Sec-
tion 37 provides:
A restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee the right-
1. To receive payment of the instrument;
2. To bring any action thereon that the indorser could bring;
3. To transfer his rights as such indorsee, where the form of
the indorsement authorizes him to do so.
But all subsequent indorsees acquire only the title of the first
indorsee under the restrictive indorsement.
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law.
1. The Negotiable Instruments Law will hereinafter be referred to as
the N. I. L.
2. The Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be referred to as the
Code. The sections from the Code herein noted are from the May, 1949,
draft.
Washington University Open Scholarship
56 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Section 47 provides:
An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be
negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or dis-
charged by payment or otherwise.
The provision of the Code, Section 3-206, relating to this type
of endorsement, provides:
When an indorsement states that it is "for collection,"
"for deposit" or that it is otherwise for the benefit or account
of the indorser or another person.
(a) if it is a blank indorsement no subsequent transferee
except an intermediary or payor bank takes the instrument
free of the indorser's rights;
(b) if it is a special indorsement it has the full effect of
such an indorsement to the person named as indorsee who
becomes the holder but remains subject to any obligation
as a fiduciary.
By the omission of Section 47 of the N.I.L. in the Code and
by the express language of Section 3-206 of the Code, several
results are hoped to be reached. Although not always recog-
nized by the courts as such, the implication if not the express
effect of Section 47 of the N.I.L. has been that the instrument,
after such an indorsement, becomes non-negotiable. Conse-
quently the rights of subsequent holders of such a non-negotiable
instrument are to be determined by the simple contract rules of
assignment. The omission of this section and the elimination of
the term "restrictive indorsement" has stripped from this type
of indorsement the effect of non-negotiability. Under the Code
a subsequent holder is permitted to assume the status of a holder
in due course, if able to meet the other requirements of the Code
for such a holder.
While an indorsement in blank for collection would under the
Code apparently preclude a subsequent holder in due course
under Section 3-304 (4), in that all subsequent holders would by
the form of the indorsement be a "purchaser with notice," a
special indorsement for collection would not have this effect.
The problems raised by these provisions of the N.I.L. and
the Code are graphically presented by the following fact situa-
tion: An endorser, by his indorsement, creates in his indorsee
an agency for collection and the indorsee, in anticipation of a
future collection of the instrument from the maker or drawer,
pays to the indorser the amount of the instrument out of his
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/9
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personal funds. At the maturity of the instrument it is dis-
honored. Two problems are thereby presented :,
(1) In an action by the indorsee against the maker or
drawer of the instrument may he recover free of defenses
which the latter party might have successfully set up in an
action by the indorser, and
(2) May such an indorsee recover from the indorser the
amount advanced to the latter?
I. In an action by the indorsee for collection against the maker
or drawer of the instrument, may the indorsee who has
advanced the amount of the instrument, recover free of the
defenses which the latter party might successfully set up in
an action by the indorser?
It is fundamental to the law of negotiable instruments that
certain defenses, termed real defenses, are available against
any subsequent holder or transferee whether or not he has
assumed the status of a holder in due course. Thus the real
defenses of capacity, fraud, duress, forgery, material alteration,
illegality and discharge in bankruptcy are available to the maker
or drawer of an instrument whether or not the plaintiff is a
holder in due course or derives his title through a holder in due
course. If therefore the maker or drawer of the instrument
proves a real defense, it will be available against an indorsee
for collection and the court will have no occasion to determine
the status of such indorsee. This result would seem to follow
whether the cases be decided under the N.I.L. or under the Code.4
If, however, the maker or drawer has a personal defense good
against any subsequent holder not in due course and not deriving
his title through such a holder, the question of a recovery by
the indorsee for collection who has advanced to the indorser the
amount of the instrument in anticipation of future collection
from the maker or drawer is immediately raised. If the indorser
3. A related problem, not within the purview of the present discussion,
arises where the form of the indorsement does not create the agency rela-
tionship, but by virtue of a separate contract between the indorser and in-
dorsee, the indorsee is made a mere agent for collection. Should such an
indorsee's rights, in an action against the maker or drawer of the instru-
ment, be the same as or superior to those of an indorsee likewise made an
agent for collection by the form of the indorsement rather than by separate
contract?
4. CoDx, § 3-305.
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for collection is either a holder in due course himself, or derives
his title through such a holder and is not himself a party to any
fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, the indorser would
have all of the rights of a holder in due course and might re-
cover free of the maker's or drawer's defense.; Likewise the
indorsee, being a holder 6 and deriving his title from his indorser
for collection, the latter being a holder in due course himself or
deriving his title through such a holder, should be entitled to a
recovery free of the personal defense of the maker or drawer.
On the other hand, if the maker or drawer has a personal
defense and the indorser for collection is neither a holder in due
course nor derives his title through such a holder, a recovery
by the indorsee for collection who has advanced the amount of
the instrument to the indorser in anticipation of future collection
from the maker or drawer is more difficult to justify under the
N.I.L. in an action against the maker or drawer. The personal
defense of the maker or drawer should, under the circumstances,
be available against him unless the indorsee for collection is
himself capable of becoming a holder in due course, or unless
a recovery by him free of the maker's or drawer's defense is
made possible by virtue of some rule of law beyond the provisions
of the act.
A. Under the provisions of t&e N.LL.
The indorsee for collection can conceivably fulfill the require-
ments of Section 52 of the N.I.L. Being the indorsee of an order
instrument, he may be considered a "holder" as defined in Sec-
tion 191. If at the time the instrument was negotiated to him
it was complete and regular on its face; if he became the holder
of it before it was overdue and without notice that it had been
previously dishonored, if such was the fact; if he took it in good
faith, having given value; and if he had no notice of any infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the indorser, he has
seemingly met all of the requirements of a holder in due course.
The provisions of Section 47, N.I.L., however, by implication
at least, prevent the indorsee for collection from acquiring the
status of a holder in due course and relegate him to the status
of a mere assignee of a non-negotiable instrument. The result
5. N. I. L. § 58.
6. N. I. L. § 191.
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of Section 47, N.I.L., is to render the instrument non-negotiable
after an indorsement for collection, under the N.I.L., such in-
dorsement being termed "restrictive." Since after such an in-
dorsement the indorsee for collection is merely the assignee of
the indorser's rights, it would seem that nothing in the N.I.L.
would prevent the maker or drawer from setting up a defense
which he might have set up against the indorser.
To deny a recovery to such an indorsee for collection, after
he has parted with value and otherwise meets the requirements
of Section 52 of the N.I.L. may at first blush appear to be an
unjust result. It should be remembered, however, that the same
result is also reached where the assignee of non-negotiable
paper seeks to recover from the obligor of the instrument. The
obligor of a non-negotiable instrument is entitled to set up most
defenses against subsequent assignees even though the assignee
may be a bona fide purchaser of the assigned right. This result
is reached not because of anything which the assignee has done
or has not done, but simply because the obligor failed to execute
an instrument meeting the requirements or negotiability under
the N.I.L. Likewise, the indorsee for collection is denied a re-
covery against the drawer of the instrument, not because of
anything which the indorsee failed to do to become a holder in
due course, but simply because his indorser has chosen to utilize
a method of instrument which by virtue of the N.I.L., Section
47, destroyed the negotiability of the instrument even though
the instrument in its origin was negotiable.
It should be borne in mind that if the maker or drawer has
by his statement or action estopped himself, the defense will not
be available against the indorsee for collection, though the latter
be considered a mere assignee.
Two sections of the N.I.L. would seem to permit the maker
or drawer to set up personal defenses against the indorsee for
collection, despite the latter's advancement of the amount of
the instrument to the indorser. Section 37 (2), N.I.L., provides:
A restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee the
right-
(2) bring any action thereon that the indorser could
bring;
7. N. I. L. § 36(2).
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Section 47, N.I.L., provides:
An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be
negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed * * * *
Beutel attempts an interpretation of these two sections which
would permit an indorsee for collection to assume the status of
a holder in due course.
It should be noted that N.I.L. 47 which is invoked here
does not provide that an instrument is non-negotiable after
it is restrictively indorsed or discharged. It merely provides
that the instrument remains negotiable until that event
(having in mind, perhaps, conditional indorsements, sees.
33 and 39, conditional acceptances, sec. 141 (1), qualified
acceptances, sec. 142, and the like). Thereafter, the effect of
transfer is governed by the appropriate sections, in this case
secs. 36 and 37, and the equities of the case.... Sec. 191 pro-
vides, "In this act, unless the contents require otherwise, in-
dorsement means indorsement coupled with delivery. When
the term indorsement in sec. 47 is given this meaning it
seems that the instrument would not lose its negotiability
until after it was delivered to the restrictive indorsee. Thus
the first restrictive indorsee under this interpretation might
be a holder in due course if the form of the restrictive in-
dorsement and the nature of the transaction were such as
would permit it.
In short, this interpretation would say that the restrictive in-
dorsement by virtue of N.I.L., Section 47, would not become
effective as rendering the instrument non-negotiable until a de-
livery to the restrictive indorsee had been completed; that the
indorsee for collection might, the other requirements having
been met, acquire the status of a holder in due course at the
exact moment when the instrument became non-negotiable be-
cause of the restrictive indorsement completed by a delivery.
This authority in the field of negotiable instruments, having set
out with a fixed determination to permit a recovery by the re-
strictive indorsee free of personal defenses of the maker or
drawer, would permit the indorsee by such questionable reason-
ing to acquire the status of a holder in due course. While no
case has been found which follows this reasoning, several cases
have reached the same result by other methods of reasoning.
Professor Britton, on the other hand, reaches the opposite
conclusion.
8. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 615 (Beutel's ed. 1948).
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A restrictive indorsee for the benefit of the restrictive
indorser, in his action against parties prior to the restrictive
indorser, is subject to the same defenses to which his prin-
cipal would be subject if he were plaintiffY
A review of the cases indicates that Professor Britton's inter-
pretation has appealed to the courts much more consistently than
any other, and that this interpretation is recognized as the cor-
rect one by courts permitting the indorsee to recover on the
basis of an estoppel.
In Smith v. Bayer,0 an indorsee "for collection and return"
was not permitted to recover free of the defense of the maker of
prior payment and he was not permitted to introduce evidence
that he was in fact the owner of a two-sevenths interest in his
own right. The court said-
We are therefore of the opinion that the present action
was rightfully brought in the name of the plaintiff. It was
open, however, as against him, to all defenses which could
have been made if the notes had remained in the hands of
the indorser and the action had been brought by it.":
A more basic discussion of the problem may be found in
Werner Piano Co. v. Henderson & Reese. 2 The payee there in-
dorsed the notes to the indorsee "for account of" the payee, and
the indorsee took the instrument before maturity in good faith
having advanced the amount of the instrument to the payee.
The defendant maker of the notes set up the defense of failure
of consideration. In holding that the indorsee took the notes
subject to the defense, the court recognized the indorsement as
restrictive under N.I.L., Section 36(2), and that the restrictive
indorsee had only the rights given it by N.I.L., Section 37. The
court declared,
It follows that the court should have declared as a matter
of law that the appellant (indorsee) was not an innocent
purchaser for value of the notes, inasmuch as it had notice,
by the restrictive indorsement of any defenses that the
makers of the notes might have against the payee. 13
While similar conclusions have been reached in other cases, 4
9. BRITTON, BILLs AND NOTES 266 (1943).
10. 46 Ore. 143, 79 Pac. 497 (1905).
11. Id. at 146, 79 Pac. at 498.
12. 121 Ark. 165, 180 S. W. 495 (1915).
13. Id. at 170, 180 S. W. at 496.
14. "The fact that the note has come into the possession of Wise [in-
dorsee] in such manner as to enable him to sue upon it does not preclude
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the language used by the court in Mizell v. Hicks,", is especially
significant. Although the negotiability of the instrument was
in "grave doubt" and there was evidence that the indorsee had
advanced no value to the indorser, the court said,
A restrictive indorsement protects the maker as well as
the payee; it confers upon the indorsee the right to receive
payment of the instrument and the right to bring any action
upon the instrument which the indorser could bring. An
indorsement "for deposit" establishes only an agency rela-
tionship between the payee and the indorsee bank; it does
not carry the legal title to the instrument to the indorsee
bank. The implication is clear that without more an indorse-
ment for deposit does not shield the indorsee bank from
the defenses available in the hands of the maker against the
original payee.16
Facts sufficient to raise an estoppel against the drawer of a
check were found by the New Jersey Court in Atlantic City Nat.
Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co.-1 The payee had given the
drawer a promisory note payable at the plaintiff bank. Unable
to meet this note at maturity, the payee procured from the
drawer the check in suit and deposited the same in its account
at the plaintiff bank under an indorsement "for deposit only."
The amount of the check was withdrawn apparently to pay the
note held by the drawer. When presented for payment, the
drawer's check was returned to the plaintiff bank, the drawer
existence of the issues described. For the indorsement of Showers, on the
record, is restrictive and of such kind as to make Wise merely the agent or
trustee of Showers (sections 36, 37, Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act;
article 5934, R. S. 1925), so that all defenses are available against him
which would be proper as against Showers if he were the plaintiff." King
v. Wise, 282 S. W. 570, 573 (Tex. 1926).
"The only action, therefore, which respondent could maintain is upon the
note. Respondent being a restrictive indorsee, it follows that his right to
maintain a suit on the right of his indorser (Citizen's State Bank) to bring
an action on it." Follett v. Clark, 19 Wash. 2d 518, 520, 143 P. 2d 536, 537(1943).
"Therefore the indorsement in fact falls within the second and third
provision of the section [§ 36], and is restrictive. The effect of this is, under
section 49 [N. I. L., § 47], that the notes, after being thus restrictively in-
dorsed, were no longer negotiable. Moreover under section 39 [N. I. L.,
§ 37], plaintiff indorsee under restrictive indorsement may bring an action
on the notes that the indorsee could bring. The indorser could not recover
against defendant because of the fraud. Plaintiffs rights, as indorsee, being
so limited under section 39 [N. I. L., § 37] and the note not being nego-
tiable under section 49 [N. I. L., § 47], it likewise may not recover." Union
Trust Co. v. Matthews, 258 Mich. 433, 437, 242 N. W. 781, 783 (1932).
15. 8 N. Y. S. 2d 158 (N. Y. 1938).
16. Id. at 161.
17. 107 N. J. L. 492, 155 At]. 762 (1931).
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having stopped payment. The plaintiff bank, a restrictive in-
dorsee of the instrument, then brought this action against thedrawer who defended on the ground of a failure of consideration.
The court declared,
The Commercial Lumber Company (drawer) was estoppedfrom setting up against the bank the defense of lack of
consideration because the bank did exactly what the Com-
mercial Lumber Company intended it to do, and that wasto advance a credit to the Atlantic Woodworking Company(indorser) on the strength of its check, so that the note itheld might be met. The Commercial Lumber Company,having put the Atlantic Woodworking Company in the posi-tion where it obtained a credit on the strength of its check,is estopped to deny its responsibility.18
Going on to discuss the problem at hand the court said,
No doubt the restrictive indorsement in the present case
created a trust and gave notice thereof to latter purchasers,but it in no sense gave notice of defenses which the maker
might claim by reason of failure of consideration .... TheEnglish courts have taken the position that, where a payeedeposits a check in his bank and receives credit therefor,the bank becomes a holder in due course thereof. BrannanNegotiable Instruments Law (4th Ed.) 288. The wisdom of
such a ruling appeals to business exigencies. But whatever
view may be taken of Section 47 of the Act, which is, asProfessor Brannan pointed out, unnecessarily broad, Id. 317,still it is not so broad as to permit the maker of a check to
assert defenses against a bank making advances on the
strength of a check, which the maker intended it to make,
so that a note which it had discounted would not be charged
up against it.9
The result in this case seems sound in view of the facts which
make the application of the principle of estoppel clearly ap-plicable. No provision of the Negotiable Instruments Law pre-
vents in any way the application of the principle of estoppel asbetween the indorsee for collection and the maker or drawer
under appropriate circumstances.
A later decision, Continental National Bank & Trust Co. v.Stirling,2o becomes so involved in the web spun by the various
sections of the N.I.L. that it ignored the applicable sections
and applied sections which obviously have no bearing at all upon
18. Id. at 494, 155 AtI. at 763.
19. Id. at 495, 155 At. at 763.20. 65 Idaho 123, 140 P. 2d 230 (1943).
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the problem at hand. The drawer entered into a contract to sell
a certain amount of coal and drew a trade acceptance upon the
purchaser who in turn accepted the draft. The drawer there-
upon indorsed the instrument "for deposit only" and sold it to
the plaintiff bank, receiving cash in payment. Prior to the time
for the payment the drawer became insolvent, the coal was never
delivered, and the acceptor (purchaser) attempted to set up
the defense of failure of consideration in an action by the
plaintiff bank. The court refused to allow the defense saying,
This presents the problem of determining whether or not
the drawer of the bill, after endorsing it "for deposit only"
could then sell the paper to the bank in which the deposit
was made, take the cash value and thereby convert the bank
into a bona fide holder in due course as against the drawee
and acceptor. It has been held, under a statute like our sec-
tion 26-319 I.C.A. (See. 48, Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act), that one who had authority to endorse and
deposit commercial items "had authority to waive the re-
strictive character of a special indorsement which he him-
self had placed on them and to collect them as though they
had been generally indorsed."2' 1
Going on, the court became even more hopelessly involved.
The only reason for denying such authority seems to be
the desire of protecting the acceptor until such time as he
receives from the drawer the goods or other consideration
for which the acceptance was made; in other words, to pre-
serve his right of defense on grounds of failure of considera-
tion. However, since the bill shows on its face that "it
arises out of the purchase of goods from the drawer," but
fails to disclose whether or not the goods have been de-
livered, there is nothing on the face of the bill to give notice
or put the purchaser of the bill on inquiry as to whether
or not the delivery of the goods has been made, or terms of
any extraneous contract. [Citing cases]. The acceptor,
having unqualifiedly promised to pay and having made no
reference or qualification in relation to the future delivery
of the goods for which the acceptance was made, should not
be heard to plead non-delivery of the goods as a justification
for refusal to pay the bill at maturity when in the hands of
a purchaser for value before maturity without notice.
The holder of negotiable instruments is not bound at his
peril to be on the alert for circumstances which might
possibly excite the suspicions of wary vigilance; he does
21. Id. at 129, 140 P. 2d at 232.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/9
INDORSEMENTS FOR COLLECTION
not owe to the party who puts the paper afloat the duty of
active inquiry in order to avert the imputation of bad faith.[citing cases.] .22
Thus it is seen that a recovery was allowed by an indorsee for
collection despite the acceptor's defense of failure of considera-
tion. This result was reached without a mention of the N.I.L.,
Sections 36, 37, or 47, which sections most certainly should be
the basis of a decision under the facts. What bearing N.I.L.,
Section 48, concerning the striking out of the indorsement not
necessary to the holder's title, or the problem of "the restrictive
character of a special indorsement" might have upon the present
discussion is difficult to imagine.
A more recent case in which the court again ignored the sec-
tions of the N.I.L. applicable to this type of indorsement is
First Nat. Bank of Quitman v. Moore.23 The drawer unsuccess-
fully sought to set up a prior payment of the check to the in-
dorser in an action by the indorsee who had previously advanced
the amount of the instrument to the indorser. The drawer, at
the time he made the payment to the indorser, knew that the
check had been deposited in the indorsee bank and the indorser
exhibited a deposit slip with a penciled notation indicating that
the check has been deposited "for collection." In allowing a
recovery by the indorsee bank, the court said that the "bank
became the owner and holder of said check for value in due
course" stating that the drawer was "negligent" in not ascer-
taining whether or not the bank had actually allowed the in-
dorser to withdraw the amount of the check from his account.
It is submitted that the result reached is correct although the
correctness of the court's conclusion that the bank was a holder
in due course is open to doubt. Even if we assumed that Section
47, N.I.L. were to destroy the negotiability of the instrument
and that after the indorser were allowed to withdraw the amount
of the check the bank became thereby a mere assignee for value
of the indorser's rights to the instrument, still the drawer had
notice of the assignment and in making a payment to the as-
signor, did so at his own risk. Since the defense of payment by
the drawer (obligor) is based upon facts arising after the time
of the assignment to the indorsee bank and after notice of the
22. Ibid.
23. 220 S. W. 2d 694 (Tex. 1949).
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assignment was received by the drawer (obligor), the latter,
upon simple contract principles of assignment could not set up
the defense against the indorsee bank.24
It is submitted that a fair interpretation of Sections 36, 37
and 47, N.I.L., will preclude an indorsee for collection from be-
coming a holder in due course, notwithstanding the fact that
such an indorsee can otherwise meet the requirements of N.I.L.,
Section 52, simply because at the time he receives the instru-
ment it is non-negotiable. While it is undoubtedly true that in
making an advancement of the amount of the instrument to the
indorser he does so in anticipation or expectation of the future
collection of the instrument from the drawer or maker of the
instrument, the form of the indorsement renders the instrument
non-negotiable. An indorsee of a non-negotiable instrument
under such a situation, even though he be considered a "holder"
of the instrument, is a mere assignee for value, subject to all
defenses which would be available to the obligor of any other
simple contract. It should be remembered, however, that an
assignee of a right under a simple contract is shielded from
certain defenses, especially those arising after the obligor has
notice of the assignment, and those which the obligor may be
estopped to set up.
B. Under the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Section 3-206 of the Code expressly applies to indorsement
"for collection," "for deposit" or where it is stated to be for
the benefit of the indorser or some third person. It thus deals
with the type of indorsements termed "restrictive" by the N.I.L.,
Section 36(2) and (3). While not within the subject of this
discussion, it is interesting to note that an indorsement purport-
ing to prohibit further transfer or negotiation restrictive under
N.I.L., Sections 36(1), is not covered by the Code in Section
3-206, which deals with the other types of indorsements recog-
nized as restrictive under the N.I.L.
The Code has eliminated the use of the word "restrictive" as
used in the N.I.L. and has omitted Section 37, N.I.L. This new
approach to the indorsements recognized as restrictive under
Section 36 (2) and (3) has removed any implication that such
24. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs § 167(1) (1932). CODE, § 3-206, Purposes
of Changes 2 (1949).
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an indorsement renders the instrument non-negotiable. The
Code does, however, make a very vital distinction between blank
and special indorsements for collection. Section 3-206 provides:
When an indorsement states that it is "for collection,"
"for deposit" or that it is otherwise for the benefit or account
of the indorser or other person
(a) if it is a blank indorsement no subsequent transferee
except an intermediary or payor bank takes the in-
strument free of the indorser's rights;
(b) if it is a special indorsement it has the full effect of
such an indorsement to the person named as indorsee
who becomes the holder but remains subject to any
obligation as a fiduciary.
Because of this distinction between blank and special indorse-
ments "for collection" it is necessary that the effect of the dis-
tinction be fully appreciated.
(1) Effect of a blank indorsement for collection.
Paragraph (a) of Section 3-206 was intended by the framers
of the Code for the protection of bank depositors and others who
indorse in blank but add the indicated words. "The purpose of
such an indorsement is to restrict the transfer of the instrument
to the collection process, and any subsequent holder is on notice
of that fact. He is also on notice that the instrument was de-
livered or intended to be delivered to an agent or other fiduciary,
of whose identity he is necessarily uncertain. He is therefore
not free to take the instrument in reliance on the assumption that
the person with whom he deals is that fiduciary and is acting
in accordance with the authority given him by the indorser. '' 25
Thus the Code while eliminating the use of the term "restric-
tive" from the actual section, has expressly recognized, as will
be later seen, that a blank indorsement for collection is in fact
restrictive, in the sense that there cannot thereafter be a holder
in due course.26 That a blank indorsement for collection retains
25. It is interesting to note that the word "restrict" cannot be legislated
from our legal vocabulary by simple omission.
26. The use of the term "restrictive" in the N. I. L., in light of § 47,
seems to be a restriction on further negotiability of the instrument, through
the form of indorsement. Such an indorsement is, although not termed
"restrictive" by the Code, in fact a restriction on future holders, not per-
mitting them to become holders in due course, because of the form of the
indorsement.
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the effect of a restrictive indorsement under the N.I.L. is borne
out by other sections of the Code. Section 3-204 (2) provides:
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular in-
dorsee, and may consist of a mere signature. An instrument
payable to order and indorsed in blank becomes payable to
bearer and may be negotiated by delivery alone until spe-
cially indorsed or indorsed in blank for collection.27
After a blank indorsement for collection it is clear that no
subsequent holder could be a holder in due course because he
would, because of the form of the indorsement, be a purchaser
with notice. The pertinent parts of the section dealing with
notice to the purchaser is Section 3-304, Subsections (1) and (4).
(1) Notice means that upon all the facts and circum-
stances known to the purchaser he has reasonable grounds
to believe that there is an infirmity in the instrument or a
claim against it or that it is over due or dishonored.
(4) Except as provided with respect to conditional, trust
or collection indorsements in the course of bank collections
(Section 3-642), the purchaser also has notice of a claim
against the instrument if it has been previously indorsed
conditionally or in such a manner as to prohibit further
negotiation or in blank for collection.
Since under Section 3-302 of the Code a holder in due course
is defined as "a holder who takes the instrument... (a) without
notice.., of any... claim against it on the part of any person,"
and since by Section 3-304(4) the purchaser has "notice of a
claim against the instrument if it has been previously indorsed
... in blank for collection," it would seem clear that after a
blank indorsement for collection there could never be a holder
in due course. Such a person would therefore have only the
rights of one not a holder in due course.-s
27. No interpretation of this section is here attempted. Two things about
this section strike one as interesting, however. First, if an order instru-
ment after a blank indorsement cannot be negotiated by delivery alone, then
some indorsement will be necessary by the blank indorsee for collection.
Does this section not convert a blank indorsement for collection into a spe-
cial indorsement? Second, if an indorsee for collection under a blank in-
dorsement converts the indorsement into a special indorsement by placing
his name as special indorsee, is such indorsement then covered by subsection
a. or b. of § 3-206 of the Code?
28. CODE, § 3-206, provides:
"Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person takes the
instrument subject to:
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and(b) all defenses of any part which would be available in an action on a
simple contract; and
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An indorsee for collection who took the instrument under a
blank indorsement for collection and who advanced to his in-
dorser the amount of the instrument in anticipation of future
collection from the maker or drawer, would in an action against
such maker or drawer, because of the form of the indorsement,
be precluded from being a holder in due course.2 9 As one not a
holder in due course he would be subject to all defenses which
the maker could have set up against the indorser, unless the
maker or drawer would be precluded from setting up the defense
upon the basis of estoppel or under the simple contract prin-
ciples of assignment.30
In conclusion it can be stated that the framers of the Uniform
Commercial Code have eliminated the use of the term "restric-
tive" as applied to indorsement and have omitted the provision
of Section 47, N.I.L., which would render an instrument non-
negotiable after indorsements termed "restrictive" by Section 36,
N.I.L. They have, however, retained the effect of an indorse-
ment falling under the description of "restrictive" in the N.I.L.
and have seemingly extended the effect to conditional indorse-
ments. Thus it may be said that all indorsements classified as
"restrictive" under Section 36 (2) and (3) N.I.L., except special
indorsements of that class, all indorsements classified as "re-
strictive" under Section 36(1), N.I.L. (although now considered
by the Code separately) and all conditional indorsements have
the effect under Section 3-304 of the Code of making any sub-
sequent holder a purchaser with notice so as to prevent his
becoming a holder in due course.
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance of
any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special purpose; and
(d) the defense that the plaintiff or a person through whom he holds the
instrument acquired it by theft. The claim of any third person to the instru-
ment is not otherwise available as a defense to any party liable thereon
unless the third person himself defends the action for such party."
29. The argument might be made that since § 3-304 of the Code makes a
purchaser one with notice only if the instrument "has been previously in-
dorsed in blank for collection," that such section does not apply to the pur-
chaser at the time of the indorsement in blank for collection. Such an argu-
ment would seemingly not be a valid one and would be similar to the one
advanced in BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 615.
30. A conditional indorsement or one prohibiting the further indorsement
of the instrument, as defined by § 3-205 of the Code, would seem to have the
same effect, in that under § 3-304(4) of the Code, such indorsements, be-
cause of their form, would make all subsequent holders holders with notice.
This in effect prevents a conditional indorsee from being a holder in due
course, which effect was not necessary under the N. I. L. See CODE,
§ 3-205, Purposes of Changes 3 (1949).
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Little, it would seem, has been accomplished. There is no
difference in effect at least, in saying that an indorsement
renders an instrument non-negotiable or in saying that an
indorsement does not render the instrument non-negotiable but
it prevents there being a holder in due course. Except for cer-
tain procedural advantages, one not a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument is no better off than an assignee of a non-
negotiable instrument.
(2) Effect of Special Indorsement for Collection.
Paragraph (b) of Section 3-206 of the Code seems to have
changed completely the effect of a special indorsement for
"collection," "for deposit" or which otherwise by the form of
the indorsement is the benefit or account of the indorser or an-
other person. This type of indorsement would be classified as
"restrictive" under Sections 36 (2) and (3) of the N.I.L. and
presumably would, under Section 47, N.I.L., destroy the nego-
tiability of the instrument.
The purpose of the framers of this subsection is declared to be:
Such a special indorsement is an assurance to any subse-
quent holder that the indorsee is authorized to deal with the
instrument on behalf of the indorser or another; and in the
absence of notice that the indorsee is acting in breach of his
fiduciary duty as provided in the section on notice to pur-
chaser such a holder is free to assume that the indorsee is
acting-properly and in accordance with his authority.
The provision is intended to change the result of such
decisions as Gulbraznson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis.
326, 175 N.W 93 (1919), which held that an indorsee under
an indorsement in trust could not be a holder in due course
and must take the instrument subject to any defenses or
equities good against his indorser. Even a collecting agent
may become a holder in due course under such an indorse-
ment if he advances money and acquires a lien on the in-
strument in good faith without notice of anything wrong.
The provision also has the effect of permitting the indorsee
to negotiate the instrument further, although he of course
remains subject to any personal liability for breach of his
obligation as a fiduciary. Under the section on notice to
purchaser the form of the indorsement is not of itself
notice to any subsequent holder which will prevent him from
taking the instrument as a holder in due course, although
he may still have notice of a breach of the fiduciary obliga-
tion apart from the indorsement.31
31. CODE, § 3-206, Purposes of Changes 3 (1949).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss1/9
INDORSEMENTS FOR COLLECTION
Gulbranson-Dickson Co. v. Hopkins,32 used by the framers of
the Code as an example of the type case which 3-206 (b) of the
Code is intended to change, seems to have been a most unfortu-
nate choice and has been misunderstood. In that case the payee
of a note negotiated it by an indorsement restrictive under N.I.L.
Section 36(3). The indorsee named was a bank and the in-
dorsement was for the account of the plaintiff, the beneficiary
under the indorsement, who had given the indorser value for
the instrument. Upon a dishonor by the maker of the note, the
restrictive indorsee turned the notes over to the beneficiary who
in turn brought suit upon the note. The maker set up the defense
of failure of consideration. While it is true that the court held
that "the indorsement rendered the instrument non-negotiable"
it must be remembered that the plaintiff was not the indorsee
under the restrictive indorsement, but was in fact the beneficiary
under the indorsement. As such beneficiary, the plaintiff was
neither a payee nor indorsee and could not have been a "holder"
under the definition of Section 191, N.I.L. It is elementary that
before one can become a holder in due course one must first be a
"holder." Even if we should assume that the restrictive indorsee,
the bank, when it "returned" the note to the plaintiff, indorsed
it to him, the plaintiff, although a holder, would not become a
holder in due course since no value was given for this last
indorsement of the restrictive indorsee bank.
The Code has provided a new definition of holder in Section
1-201 (17) :
17. "Holder" means a person who has possession of a
negotiable document of title or a negotiable instrument or
investment security so issued or indorsed that he can nego-
tiate it.
Thus before a person standing in the position of the plaintiff
in the case under discussion could become a holder in due course
under the Code, he must first meet the Code's requirements for
being a holder. Since the form of the special indorsement, being
for the account of the plaintiff, would not affect the negotiable
character of the instrument, and since the plaintiff would be a
"person who has possession of a negotiable instrument," he
could thus be termed a holder if the instrument "was so indorsed
that he can negotiate it."
32. 170 Wis. 326, 170 N. W. 93 (1919).
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That the indorsement of the plaintiff as beneficiary under such
special indorsement is not only unnecessary but impossible, is
borne out by the provision of the Code, Section 3-204, which
provides:
(1) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom
or to whose order it makes the instrument payable. Any
instrument specially indorsed becomes payable to the order
of the special indorser (indorsee) 33 and may be further
negotiated only by his indorsement.
Since the indorsement of the special indorsee bank, rather than
the indorsement of the plaintiff beneficiary under the special
indorsement, is necessary for further negotiation, the plaintiff
could not assume the status of a holder in due course because he
could not meet the Code's requirements for being a holder.14
It is submitted that under the fact situation presented by
Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, a court deciding the case
under the provisions of the Code would be driven to the same
result as that reached by the Wisconsin court under the N.I.L.
The plaintiff, under the special indorsement to the bank for
plaintiff's account, could not acquire the status of a holder in due
course and would therefore be subject to the same defenses which
would have been available in an action on a simple contract.
Even if we admit without argument that the result of the
principal case works an injustice, still the framers of the Code
have not succeeded in removing the injustice under the Code
provisions. The problem there presented, however, arose out of
an indorsement for the benefit of a third person, formerly termed
restrictive under N.I.L., Section 36(3), and such problems are
not presented by an indorsement for collection or for the benefit
-of the indorser, which indorsements were termed restrictive
under N.I.L., Section 36 (2).
The result which the framers hoped to reach has, however,
33. Obviously this is a typographical error and should read "indorsee"
rather than "indorser."
34. As stated previously, even if the special indorsee bank, in turning the
instrument over to the plaintiff, had indorsed it to the plaintiff, the latter
would not be a holder in due course. While meeting the requirement of CODES1-201 (17) so that he could be classed as a "holder," he could not then be a
older in due course because he would have given no value for the bank's
indorsement. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the indorsee bank,
-prior to the indorsement of the plaintiff, while meeting the Code require-
ment for a holder would likewise be unable to recover as a holder in due
course because the bank gave no value for the indorsement to it, the value
having been given to the indorser by the beneficiary.
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been accomplished insofar as indorsements for collection are
concerned. Under the Code a special indorsement for collection
is to be treated as any other special indorsement and the form
of such special indorsement would have no effect upon the future
negotiability of the instrument nor would it be said to constitute
the purchaser a holder with notice. Thus if the special indorsee
could meet the other requirements of the Code for holders in
due course, he could assume such status and recover free of the
personal defenses of the drawer or maker of the instrument.
(3) Conclusion as to Effect of Code.
A review of the sections of the Code applicable to indorse-
ments for collection, leads to the conclusion that with one major
exception the effect of such an indorsement has remained un-
changed. Thus in an action by an indorsee for collection against
the maker or drawer of the instrument, where the indorsee has
advanced the amount of the instrument to the indorser in antici-
pation of a future collection of the instrument from the maker
or drawer, his recovery free of the personal defenses which the
maker or drawer might have set up against the indorser will
depend entirely upon the form of the indorsement.
If the form of the indorsement is blank, the indorsee who
advanced the amount of the instrument out of his personal funds
will necessarily be a purchaser, but because of the form of the
indorsement he will be a purchaser with notice. He cannot under
such circumstances acquire the status of a holder in due course
and will be subject to all defenses available against his indorser
as if the suit had been brought upon a simple contract.
If on the other hand the form of the indorsement is special,
the indorsee who has advanced the amount of the instrument out
of his personal funds, will not because of the form of the indorse-
ment be declared a purchaser with notice. Thus if he can other-
wise meet the requirements of a holder in due course, he will
be entitled to recover free of the personal defenses which the
maker or drawer might have set up in an action by the indorser.
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II. May an indorsee for collection, upon dishonor by the maker
or drawee, recover from the indorser after tko former has
advanced the amount of the instrument in anticipation of
future collection?
That such an indorser should be liable to his indorsee under
such circumstances cannot be seriously questioned. The indorsee
in advancing his personal funds to his indorser has done so solely
in anticipation of the future collection from the maker or drawer
of the intrument. His expectation that upon a subsequent dis-
honor he will be reimbursed by his indorser is quite natural. The
only question which concerns us therefore should be whether or
not under the provisions of either the N.I.L. or the Code, he is
permitted to do so.
A. Under the provisions of the N.LL.
To find a basis of recovery in the sections of the N.I.L. has
proven difficult if not impossible. This fact was recognized at
an early date and the N.I. L. was for that reason, among others,
severely criticized at the turn of the century.35
Professor Britton assumes that technically an indorser of the
class defined in N.I.L., Section 36(2) is not, by virtue of any
provision of the N.I.L., made liable to a subsequent holder be-
cause his indorsement is not unqualified within the meaning of
the last paragraph of Section 66, N.I.L. Conceding that in justice
the indorser should be held liable to the indorsee, Professor
Britton states:
35. Speaking of § 37 of the N. I. L., Dean James Barr Ames felt that
neither an indorsee for collection nor the beneficiary under a trust indorse-
ment as defined in § 36(3) of the N. I. L., could recover in an action against
the indorser, even though the indorser or the beneficiary had given the in-
dorser value for the instrument. Ames at this time was involved in a
dispute with Judge Brewster concerning the interpretation and effect of
certain sections of the act, including § 37, and proposed the following
hypothetical case:
A, a holder of the note payable to his order, sells it to B and is about to
indorse it to him, but at B's request, indorses it to X in trust for B,
instead of to B directly. At the maturity of the note the maker is in-
solvent, but A is solvent. By this section X, the indorsee, may sue any-
one that his indorser can sue. In other words, he may sue the insolvent
maker, but he cannot sue the solvent indorser, A. Judge Brewster sees no
injustice to B in the inability of X, his trustee, to sue A, upon the latter's
indorsement. Let us hope that the learned judge will never find himself in
B's position. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, A Word More, 14
HARV. L. REV. 442, 446 (1901).
But see Brewster, The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Rejoinder to
Dean Ames, 15 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1901).
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Some difficulty is encountered, however, in reaching this
result because it involves the conversion of the restrictive
indorsement into an unqualified indorsement. It might be
said that since the act which brings about the need for
conversion of the restrictive indorsement into an unqualified
indorsement occurs subsequent to the restrictive indorse-
ment, parol testimony would be admissible for the purpose
of removing the restrictive words, their purpose having
been accomplished, thus leaving the indorsement of the
first restrictive indorser in the form of an unqualified
indorsement36
Even if the court were willing to follow so tedious a line of
reasoning, it would apparently not lead to the result which
Professor Britton desired. Even if the indorsement for collection
under such circumstances is admitted to be unqualified under the
terms of N.I.L., Section 38,3" such an indorsee could hardly base
his cause of action upon the warranties of an unqualified in-
dorser under Section 66, N.I.L.,38 because such warranties extend
only to "subsequent holders in due course." In light of Section
47, N.I.L., such an indorsee can hardly claim to be a holder in
due course of a negotiable instrument.
It must be constantly borne in mind, however, that to hold
that such an indorsement, under Section 47, N.I.L., renders the
instrument non-negotiable and that subsequent parties, including
the indorsee, become mere assignees, does not prevent a re-
covery under simple contract principles of assignment. Even an
assignor for value of a simple contract is held to make certain
warranties; he warrants to the assignee that he will do nothing
to defeat or impair the value of the assignment, that the right,
36. BRITTON, op. cit. supra note 9, § 69.
37. N. I. L. § 38, states:
A qualified indorsement constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the
title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the indorser's words
"without recourse," or any words of similar import. Such an indorsement
does not impair the negotiable character of the instrument.
38. N. I. L., § 66, states:
"Every indorser who indorses without qualification warrants to all sub-
sequent holders in due course:
1. The matters and things mentioned in subdivision one, two and three
of the next preceding section; and
2. That the instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and sub-
sistin g.And in addition, he engages that on due presentment, it shall be accepted
or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor, and that if it be
dishonored, and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he
will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser
who may be compelled to pay it."
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as assigned, actually exists and is subject to no limitations or
defenses other than those stated or apparent at the time of the
assignment, and that the token writing or evidence of the right
delivered to the assignee is genuine and what it purports to be.
Thus if an indorser for collection having received the advance-
ment from his indorsee, does anything to defeat or impair the
value of the assigned instrument, or if there are defenses which
he did not make known to the indorsee which were not apparent
at the -time of the indorsement, or if the instrument were not
genuine, he could be held liable on the basis of his warranties
as the assignor of a non-negotiable contract right.3 9 While such
warranties do not insure a recovery in all cases, as where the
maker or drawer becomes insolvent, it does permit the indorsee
to recover in a substantial number of cases.
Another theory of recovery which has been used in allowing a
recovery by the indorsee is restitution or money had and re-
ceived.40
B. Under the provisions of the Code.
Since the form of an indorsement for collection would not
affect the negotiability of the instrument, Section 3-422, Code,
would presumably allow an indorsee for collection to recover
from the indorser under the stated facts. Section 3-422 provides:
(1) Every indorser who does not specify to the contrary
on the instrument engages that upon dishonor and any
necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will pay the
amount of the instrument to the holder or to any subsequent
indorser who takes it up. If he transfers the instrument for
consideration he also gives the warranties of a transferor
under the preceding section.41
39. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 175 (1932). See also WILIJSTON, CON-
TRACTS, § 445, 445A (rev. ed. 1936).
40. White v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658 (1880).
41. CODE, § 3-421, provides:
"(1) Unless otherwise agreed any party who transfers an instrument
for consideration warrants to his transferee or any subsequent holder if
such person takes the instrument in good faith
(a) that all signatures are genuine or authorized and that the instru-
ment is not materially altered; and
(b) that the title conveyed is good and its transfer rightful and that no
defense of any party is good against the transferor; and(c) that the transferor has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding
instituted with respect to the maker or acceptor or the drawer or an
unaccepted instrument.
(2) Unless otherwise specified on the instrument any such transferor
gives to a party who pays or accepts in good faith the warranties of a
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(2) "Without recourse" or words of similar import added
to an indorsement limits the liability of the indorser to the
following warranties:
(a) that all signatures are genuine or authorized and that
the instrument is not materially altered; and
(b) that the title conveyed is good and its transfer right-
ful; and
(c) that the indorser has no knowledge of any defense of
any party good against him, or of any insolvency pro-
ceedings instituted with respect to the maker or ac-
ceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted instrument.
Under this section "every indorser," whether or not he has
received value for the instrument,4 2 warrants that he will pay
the amount of the instrument to the holder, in the absence of
an expression of a contrary intention contained on the instru-
ment. It should be noted that the warranties of an indorser
are not limited to "subsequent holders in due course"4 3 but ex-
tend as well to "the holder or any subsequent indorser who
takes it up."
Unless the form of the indorsement for collection, either
special or blank, can be said to indicate a contrary intention, the
indorser for collection falling within the broad term "every
indorser" should be held liable to his indorsee who has advanced
the amount of the instrument from his personal funds "upon
dishonor and any necessary notice of dishonor and protest."
While the question presented under the stated facts does not
extend to the rights of an indorsee for collection who has made
no advancement out of his personal funds, the wording of Sec-
tion 3-422 seems sufficiently broad to permit a recovery by such
an indorsee against the indorser. Most certainly an indorsee for
collection who has made no advancement to his indorser could
make no claim for a payment from his indorser. Unquestionably
such result was not intended by the framers of the Code. What
method is to be utilized in preventing this obviously unjust
result is unimportant to the present discussion except insofar
as it has a bearing upon an indorsee who has advanced value to
person obtaining payment or acceptance if he were himself obtaining pay-
ment or acceptance.
(3) A selling agent or broker who does not disclose the fact that he is
acting only as such gives the warranties provided in this section, but if he
makes such disclosure warrants only his good faith and authority.
42. CoDE, § 3-422, Purposes of Changes 1 (1949).
43. N. I. L. § 66.
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his indorser. If in order to prevent a recovery by the indorsee
who has made no advancement, the form of an indorsement for
collection is interpreted as indicating a contrary intention under
Subsection (1), Section 3-422, the unfortunate result will be to
likewise deny to the indorsee who has advanced value, the bene-
fits of this subsection.
If the indorsee, under the stated facts, is denied the benefits
of Section 3-422 (1), Code, nothing has been accomplished inso-
far as the present problem is concerned. Such indorsee would
then be left in the same position that he has found himself under
the N.I.L. and would be forced to base his claim for recovery
upon the warranties of an assignor for value or upon the theory
of restitution of money had and received.
III. Conclusion.
The narrow situation herein considered arises, as has been
previously stated, from facts under which it appears that an
indorser, by his indorsement, has created in his indorsee an
agency for collection and the indorsee has, in anticipation of
the future collection of the instrument from the maker or
drawer, paid the amount of the instrument to the indorser out
of his personal funds.
The frequency with which this siutation has presented itself
indicates the common use of such an indorsement in the com-
mercial world. If such an indorsement is to be recognized and
permitted by our law, then the two basic problems herein dis-
cussed will likewise present themselves. Neither the N.I.L. nor
the Code is the source of either problem. They are inherent in
and arise solely from the facts. It is true that a uniform act may
make the solution of these problems more or less difficult, de-
pending upon the draftsmanship of their framers and the skill
of the courts in interpreting the applicable sections. So long,
however, as this form of indorsement is permitted to be used,
these basic problems will present themselves and require a solu-
tion. They arose under the common law, they arise under the
N.I.L., and they will continue to arise under the Code in what-
ever form it may be adopted.
Under such indorsement either of the following situations
may arise:
1. The indorsee, after advancing his money to the indorser,
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may find that the maker or drawer has a valid defense to
the instrument as against the indorser. If the indorser is
insolvent, or the indorsee is otherwise unable to secure a
reimbursement from his indorser, this question will arise:
Should the indorsee under such circumstances be permitted
to recover on the instrument in an action against the maker
or drawer, free of the latter's defense?
2. The indorsee, after parting with his money to the indorser
may find himself unable or unwilling to attempt a recovery
for the amount of the instrument from the maker or
drawer. This question will therefore arise: Should such an
indorsee be permitted to recover on the instrument in an
action against the indorser the amount of the instrument
which he has previously advanced to the latter?
Whether we decide that the indorsee should or should not be
permitted a recovery in both instances, the draftsmanship of the
framers of a particular statute should be judged by the ease and
certainty by which a court is led by the statute to reach a chosen
result. A statute is not therefore necessarily defective or im-
perfectly drawn simply because the framers have failed to agree
with us that the result which we would have reached is the
correct one. Consequently, any criticism of either the N.I.L. or
the Code as it regards the situation under discussion must be
two-fold. First, is the end result selected by the framers a
desirable one, and second, assuming that the result selected is a
desirable one, are the provisions of the statute well designed to
insure that the result will consistently be reached by the several
courts which will have occasion to apply it?
The N.I.L has met criticism almost from its inception. That
it would require revision was clearly prophesied as early as 1901
when Dean Ames, after a criticism of some dozen sections, in-
cluding Section 37, said that the N.I.L. would "establish rules
opposed alike to justice and well established law. Their enact-
ment must inevitably be followed, sooner or later, by additional
legislation to remedy the evils they would introduce.4 This
prophecy, while largely directed at the end results selected by
the framers of the N.I.L. and not necessarily at their drafts-
manship, has at long last been justified. After a half a century,
44. Ames, supra note 35, at 449.
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with the attendant changes in commercial practices relating to
the handling of commercial paper, the American Law Institute
and the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform
Laws are now engaged in a "complete revision and moderniza-
tion of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law."' 5
In evaluating the work of the framers of the Code, we must,
as has been previously stated, view it from two separate points
of view.
(1) As to the result reached.
(a) Under the N.I.L., the indorsee, under the stated facts, was
not be permitted to recover from the maker or the drawer free of
the personal defenses which the latter might have successfully
set up against the indorser. In most instances, however, such a
recovery might be had either upon the application of the doctrine
of estoppel, or upon basic contract principles of assignment,
depending upon the facts in a given case.
Under the Code, the indorsee, under the stated facts, would not
.be permitted to recover from the maker or the drawer free of
the personal defenses which the latter might have successfully
set up against the indorser, if the indorsement was a blank in-
dorsement. In most cases a recovery might be had upon the
application of the doctrine of estoppel or upon basic contract
principles of assignment. If, however, the form of the indorse-
ment is special, the indorsee would be permitted to recover under
specific code provisions, depending upon the facts in the given
case. Thus it is seen that the end result remains the same under
both the N.I.L. and the Code, except in the case of a special
indorsee for collection.
(b) Under the N.I.L., the indorsee, under the stated facts
was not by virtue of any provision of the N.I.L. given the right
of recovery against his indorser. His recovery will depend there-
upon upon the application of a principle of law not included in
that act, such as restitution for money had and received, or the
warranties of an assignor of a simple non-negotiable instrument.
Under the Code, the question of the indorsee's recovery will
depend upon whether or not Section 3-422 is interpreted as per-
mitting a recovery. If such an interpretation is not made as will
45. CODE, § 3-101, Comment (1949).
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permit his recovery under this section, then, as under the N.I.L.,
the recovery by the indorsee will depend upon the application of
other principles of law not included in the act.
(2) As to the effectiveness of the statute.
(a) Under the N.I.L., the provisions of Sections 36, 37 and 47
seem sufficiently clear. Section 47 provides that the indorsement
under the stated facts renders the instrument non-negotiable.
Thus there cannot thereafter be a holder in due course and the
indorsee will necessarily take his rights subject to personal de-
fenses which the maker or drawer may have. The difficulties
of the court in applying these sections has not, for the most
part, been caused by any defect in draftsmanship, but by a re-
fusal of the courts to reach the result demanded by the sections,
or by a failure to recognize and apply the applicable sections of
the N.I.L.
Under the Code the indorsement under the stated facts would
not destroy negotiability. However, if the form of the indorse-
ment is in blank, while the instrument would remain negotiable,
the indorsee could not because of the form of the indorsement
assume the status of a holder in due course. He would, by the
form of the blank indorsement be declared to be a purchaser
with notice. If, however, the form of the indorsement is special,
the indorsee could assume the status of a holder in due course,
if otherwise meeting the requirements for such holding. The
form of the special indorsement would not constitute him a
holder with notice.
Whether or not the Code will result in more consistent de-
cisions from the courts called upon to interpret and apply it, will
depend upon the courts' willingness to reach the end result and
upon the recognition and application of the applicable sections.
(b) Under the N.I.L. the indorsee under the stated facts is
given no specific remedy against his indorser. Under the Code,
however, the indorsee is given a remedy if Section 3-422 is
interpreted as being sufficiently broad to include him.
Most certainly there are grounds for reasonable doubt as to
whether the Code section is applicable so as to give the indorsee
this specific remedy. If it is interpreted as not being applicable,
the indorsee will be left as he now finds himself under the N.I.L.,
forced to basd his claim upon the doctrine of restitution for
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money had and received or upon the contract principle of war-
ranties of an assignor of a simple contract.
From this discussion it may be seen that the changes of the
Code in both theory and wording have been many and far
reaching. It is undoubtedly true that the merits of the Code
cannot be fully judged from the application of its provisions to
one or two isolated problems. It is quite possible that such
chance application will quite accidentally uncover weaknesses
in individual sections not at all common to the great bulk of the
revision.
If, however, any generalization is permitted from such a
narrow application of the few sections of the Code here at-
tempted, the Code should not be expected to be the panacea for
all the ills of the commercial world. After a half-century in
American courts most of the language of the N.I.L. has been
given specific and concrete legal meanings understood alike by
the commercial world and the legal profession. It appears un-
fortunate that a revision might not have been made which
would have left more of this wording intact and unchanged. In
so completely changing the language of the N.I.L., so many new
terms having been introduced, so many old terms having been
given new meanings, and so many sections having been re-
worded, a lengthy period of uncertainty seems assured if the
Code is adopted in its present form. It will require many years
and much judicial interpretation before the legal result under a
given set of facts can be as accurately forecasted under the
Code, as at present under the N.I.L.
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